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   ost of the advanced and largest militaries in the world have, in recent 
years, devoted significant attention and resources to the development of 
the capacity to conduct—and defend against—cyber operations.1 Indeed, 
cyber operations feature prominently in discussions over future conflicts 
and are expected to be an inherent and major component in the waging of 
war. But cyber operations are not usually conducted with the aim of 
straightforward material harm to a physical military object and their use 
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raises complex questions concerning the choice of targets. During armed 
conflict, international law provides detailed rules on targeting, most of 
which stem from the fundamental principle of distinction. At its most basic 
understanding, this rule requires that all things and people military must be 
distinguished from things and people civilian.2 It governs questions of who 
and what may be attacked. It also influences other rules on how attacks 
may be carried out—prohibitions of indiscriminate attacks and concepts of 
proportionality would in most cases become meaningless without the dis-
tinction between military and civilian.3 The principle of distinction is one of 
the foundations of the law of war. The International Court of Justice has 
described it as part of "[t]he cardinal principles contained in the texts con-
stituting the fabric of humanitarian law.”4 As such, this principle should 
presumably hold true in any type of conflict. The cyber sphere, however, 
presents unique challenges to our ability to adequately distinguish between 
military and civilian and thereby adhere to this fundamental principle. 
Moreover, the nature of cyber operations is such that it does not neatly fit 
into the paradigm of hostilities around which the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) is constructed. In fact, it has even been debated whether the 
LOAC rules on targeting would always apply to cyber operations, and 
whether the need to distinguish between military and civilian and the pro-
hibition on attacking civilian targets are applicable to all forms of cyber op-
erations or not.5 This article will examine these questions in the following 
manner. Part II will address the question of the nature of cyber operations 
                                                                                                                      
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
3. Id., art. 51 (protection of the civilian population). 
4. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. Note also the International Committee of 
the Red Cross commentary on the rule, which states the rule of protection and distinction 
is  
 
the foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs of war rests: the civilian 
population and civilian objects must be respected and protected in armed conflict, and for 
this purpose they must be distinguished from combatants and military objectives. The en-
tire system established in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and in Geneva from 1864 to 1977 
is founded on this rule of customary law.  
 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1863 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 












that are likely to take place. This will include an examination of cyber oper-
ations as fitting within the notion of attack. Part III will then turn to an 
analysis of the appropriate threshold of harm that would lead a cyber oper-
ation to be considered an attack under LOAC—and thus subject to the 
principle of distinction—with particular focus on destruction of data and 
harm that does not have direct physical manifestation.  
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF ATTACK IN CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
In order to examine what might be lawful targets in the context of cyber 
operations, we must first get an idea of what types of targets the parties to 
a conflict might seek to attack. Actual cyber operations in past years range 
from hacking into government or military networks, such as the “Titan 
Rain” incident in 2003 when U.S. Department of Defense facilities, NASA 
labs, Lockheed Martin and other systems were hacked into and lost many 
terabytes of information (Chinese sources were alleged to have been be-
hind this operation)6 through to more recent years and well-publicized 
cyber incidents directed against Estonia and Georgia, which included inci-
dents described as denial of service attacks leading to severe disruption of 
media, government and banking systems.7 The Stuxnet worm is alleged to 
have led to physical damage to centrifuges at the Iranian nuclear facilities.8 
Cyber operations have also been employed in tandem with kinetic attacks, 
as was said to have happened in the Israeli attack on an alleged nuclear de-
velopment site in Syria.9 Individuals with a personal agenda have demon-
strated the dangerous potential for using computer networks to gain con-
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number of other such incidents originating from various sources, including those known 
as “Solar Sunrise” and “Moonlight Maze,” as well as Operation “Buckshot Yankee.” For 
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dents, see H. HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR app. 1 
(2012). 
7. See the detailed discussion in ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, IN-
TERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2010). 
8. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. 













trol of complex systems and unleash serious damage.10 More generally, 
cyber attacks are described as operations seeking to accomplish a wide 
range of effects, including “[d]estroy data on a network or a system con-
nected to the network”; 11 “[b]e an active member of a network and gener-
ate bogus traffic”;12 “[c]landestinely alter data in a database stored on the 
network”;13 and “[d]egrade or deny service on a network.”14 
One way of describing all of this is simply to say that targets in cyber 
operations are usually computer network systems. It is, however, also pos-
sible to create an element of differentiation between these potential targets. 
In certain operations, such as denial of service, it is the computer system 
itself that is the object of the operation and the direct objective is to shut 
down or prevent the system from functioning as designed.15 Alternatively, 
it may be that the objective is the corruption of data on the system or the 
destruction of specific information data, in which case it might be more 
accurate to state that the target of the operation is not the system as a 
whole but rather the data.16 Lastly, if an attack is designed to take control of 
a computer network in order to directly manipulate a physical object—for 
example, take control of a missile launch system or open the floodgates of 
a dam—then it might be more accurate to describe the computer network 
as part of the means and methods of attack, while the actual target is the 
physical object directly affected.  
                                                                                                                      
10. For example, see the case of an Australian individual who caused the dumping of 
sewage into rivers, leading to serious harm to the local environment. Robert O’Harrow Jr., 
Search Engine Exposes Industrial-Sized Dangers, WASHINGTON POST (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cyber-search-engine-exposes-vulnerabi 
lities/2012/06/03/gJQAIK9KCV_story.html. In another case, a disgruntled employee 
disabled the system for detecting oil pipeline leaks off the Californian coast. David Kra-
vets, Feds: Hacker Disabled Offshore Oil Platforms’ Leak-Detection System, WIRED (Mar. 18, 
2009, 3:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/feds-hacker-dis/. See also 
Rebecca Allison, Hacker Attack Left Port in Chaos, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2003), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2003/oct/07/usnews.uknews.  
11. Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 JOURNAL OF NA-




15. For example, disrupting command and control systems, or communication net-
works. 
16. See infra pp. 256 for an analysis of whether or not data should be considered as an 












Ultimately, since the world we actually live in is not the non-material 
cyber sphere, it is clear that any cyber operation is designed to lead—
directly or indirectly—to a result which includes an effect in the physical 
world. Nonetheless, there is a qualitative difference between attacks de-
signed to gain direct control of a physical object and cause it to act in a 
specific planned way, and attacks targeting the networks and data them-
selves, aiming for more generalized knock-on effects. In the former cases, 
such as using a computer network in order to gain control of an opposing 
party’s missile system and cause it to fire upon itself, or a cyber operation 
designed to open a dam and unleash a flood, there is, of course, the need to 
assess the legality of these targets. For this determination of whether these 
are lawful targets under LOAC, such cyber operations may raise certain 
new aspects, but at the end of the day the legality question will in most cas-
es not be unique to cyber operations.17 It is in those circumstances in which 
the systems and data themselves are attacked where the more complex 
questions arise with regard to choice of target. 
A number of legal concerns must be recognized. First and foremost is, 
of course, the question of whether certain computer network systems can 
be considered military objectives, and consequently lawful targets. Further 
challenges in this context concern the ability to take adequate precautions, 
avoid disproportionate effects, and not stray beyond lawful means and 
methods. These are all matters of vital importance, but are not within the 
scope of this article focused on lawful targets.18 The issues addressed here 
                                                                                                                      
17. The LOAC rules most directly applicable include Article 56(1) of Additional Pro-
tocol I, which states that  
 
[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear elec-
trical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects 
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and con-
sequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at 
or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if 
such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and 
consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 
 
18. Cyber operations can present particular challenges in these areas due to character-
istics such as their potential capacity to spread indiscriminately through the networks, and 
to have indirect effects that may be difficult to foresee. For a discussion of some of these 
issues, see Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A Different 
Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW 1145 (2003); KNUT DÖRMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS TO COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/resources/documents/misc/68lg92.htm. For an example of a unique challenge aris-













are concerned with questions relating to the nature of the objects attacked 
and whether they must be defined as military objectives in order to be law-
ful targets of cyber operations. In other words, we are currently examining 
what can be attacked rather than how/with what.  
Before proceeding further, a preliminary matter must be clarified: the 
question of lawful targets in the ius in bello is separate from the questions of 
the ius ad bellum. While the need for maintaining a separation between these 
two areas of law has long been evident for a number of reasons,19 the dis-
cussions surrounding cyber operations have on occasion muddied the wa-
ters. Much of this is due to the fact that cyber operations present equally 
vexing problems for both bodies of law and, moreover, many of these 
challenges in both the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello surround the notion 
of “attack.”20 As has been the subject of much discussion, there is a debate 
as to whether cyber operations against certain objects might be considered 
an armed attack, thereby triggering the right to self-defense under the ius ad 
bellum.21 However, the response to that question does not provide us with 
an answer as to whether the object was a lawful target under the ius in bello; 
the debate over defining an attack as an armed attack under the ius ad bellum 
can exist regardless of the military nature of the object attacked. An event 
constituting an armed attack for the purpose of the ius ad bellum might in-
clude an attack against the military installation of another State, but equally 
if the attack was against a civilian target (e.g., bombing civilian areas of a 
city) this would also be an armed attack under the ius ad bellum. A determi-
nation of an armed attack having occurred tells us therefore nothing about 
the civilian or military nature of the object attacked—a criterion crucial to 
                                                                                                                      
David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW AND POLICY 87, 101–2 (2010). 
19. For example, the application of the ius in bello must not be linked to determina-
tions under the ius ad bellum in order to ensure equal application of the ius in bello rules, 
thus alleviating the risk of dis-incentivizing one of the parties from adhering to the rules. It 
is also notoriously difficult to agree on violations of the ius ad bellum, making any reliance 
on ius ad bellum determinations for the purpose of ius in bello rules a sure recipe for disaster. 
20. For attack in the context of the ius in bello, see the detailed discussion infra pp. 262. 
For the ius ad bellum, see the authorities infra note 21. 
21. For discussion of the ius ad bellum in the context of cyber operations, see, e.g., Mat-
thew Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network 
Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 CO-
LUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885 (1999); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE ch. II (The Use of Force) (Michael 












the determination of lawful targets under the ius in bello. Accordingly, the 
current focus is not on the ius ad bellum, but on the nature of lawful targets 
within the ius in bello.  
Another vital differentiation—and one which requires clarification—is 
the significance of using the word “attack.” As noted above, under the ius 
ad bellum, the key is whether a specific event meets the threshold of an 
armed attack. This allows for perhaps a looser usage of the phrase “cyber 
attacks” in the knowledge that this phrase does not in itself contain a legal 
determination as to whether it constitutes an armed attack under the ius ad 
bellum. This, however, is not the case for ius in bello, where—as will be seen 
shortly—the very use of the word “attack” may in and of itself have signif-
icant legal repercussions, including for the issue of lawful targets during 
these operations. For the sake of legal clarity, it would therefore be advisa-
ble to utilize a more legally neutral (at least under the ius in bello) description 
and—unless intending to define an event as an attack under LOAC—to 
speak of cyber operations rather than cyber attacks.22 This has not, unfor-
tunately, been the case thus far. In fact, it appears that the term “cyber at-
tack” has been used indiscriminately when discussing a wide range of oper-
ations, including activities such as hacking into Google servers or probing 
government computers,23 and defacing websites.24 Indeed, the U.S. De-
partment of Defense defines the phrase "computer network attack" as 
"[a]ctions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer net-
works, or the computers and networks themselves."25 This definition—or 
                                                                                                                      
22. This is reminiscent of another area of LOAC in which terms are used without due 
regard to their legal implications, most notably in the inaccurate use of the term “combat-
ant” to describe any fighter, even though the individual described might not meet the 
strict definition for being a combatant as set out in the law. For an examination of the 
difference between rhetoric, factual descriptions and legal terms in this latter context, see 
NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS ch. 6 
(2010). 
23. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions against the Effects of Attacks, 88 
TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1533, 1536–42 (2010).  
24. “The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports that cyberattacks attributed to 
terrorists have largely been limited to unsophisticated efforts such as e-mail bombing of 
ideological foes, denial-of-service attacks, or defacing of websites.” CATHERINE A. THEO-
HARY & JOHN ROLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41674, TERRORIST USE 
OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE 5 (2011), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41674_20110308.pdf. 
25. Computer Network Attack, in DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED 













similar versions—has also been used by commentators writing on the top-
ic.26 Notably, it is a wide definition that can encompass a vast array of cyber 
operations with many different types of targets and varying degrees of ef-
fects. Moreover, it includes cyber operations designed to damage data, not 
just physical destruction.27  
The dangerous ease with which we use the word “attack” causes us to 
unwittingly slide into an assumption that all these so-called attacks require 
an analysis under LOAC. But this is not always the case. There can be plen-
ty of cyber operations that occur outside the context of an armed conflict, 
such as certain types of cyber espionage between supposedly friendly coun-
tries to which the law of armed conflict would not apply.28 The inapplica-
bility of LOAC in many situations is a crucial matter which must not be 
cast aside without consideration. Once the LOAC framework enters the 
stage, the legal regulation of operations takes on a new dimension that has 
significant repercussions for all concerned.29 This is not an exhortation to 
never apply LOAC, but simply a reminder that it does not become applica-
ble purely because we use the word “attack.” LOAC can only apply within 
situations that qualify as an armed conflict. There is a complex debate as to 
whether stand-alone cyber operations between two parties—devoid of the 
kinetic actions usually associated with hostilities—can ever be considered 
an armed conflict.30 This, however, becomes less of an obstacle if the cyber 
                                                                                                                      
26. DINNISS, supra note 6, at 4. Having used this definition, Dinniss later in the same 
book notes two different concepts of attack: “the question is raised as to when a computer 
network attack becomes an attack for the purposes of international humanitarian law.” Id. 
at 179. See also Lin, supra note 11, at 63. 
27. This point will be returned to later in the examination of data as an “object” of at-
tack. 
28. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text for mention of other relevant bodies 
of law which may regulate cyber operations outside of armed conflict.  
29. For example, it can permit attacks that lead to civilian casualties that might other-
wise have been unlawful. Equally, however, if violating the LOAC rules, those conducting 
the attacks will be open to charges under international criminal law.  
30. This will largely depend on the manifestation and consequences of the cyber op-
erations. See discussion in Noam Lubell, Cyber Warfare as Armed Conflict, in BRUGES COL-
LOQUIUM, TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE HUMANITARIAN LEGAL FRAME-
WORK 41 (College of Europe & International Committee of the Red Cross eds., 2011), 
available at http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/page/collegium_41_0. 
pdf; Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89, 102–6 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & 
Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies); DÖRMANN, supra note 18, at 2–3. At least in theory, the possibility does exist as 












operations are conducted alongside traditional methods of warfare.31 The 
current focus of this article is on circumstances in which cyber operations 
take place between parties to an existing armed conflict and in which, 
therefore, LOAC has already been triggered.  
The need for concern over the correct use of the term “attack” be-
comes evident when considering the repercussions of cyber operations that 
take place during armed conflict but might not, arguably, constitute an “at-
tack” under the ius in bello. The key issue here is whether defining these op-
erations as not being attacks can thereby expand the choice of lawful tar-
gets beyond the sphere of military objectives. For example, does a denial of 
service operation against a website constitute an attack? If so, then clearly 
the categorization of the website attacked as a legitimate military objec-
tive—or not—will be a vital concern. But what if denial of service is not an 
“attack” as understood in LOAC, and how might this affect the legality of 
directing a cyber operation against the website? In other words, does the 
nature of the targeted website even matter? Can one engage in cyber opera-
tions against non-military targets by claiming that the said cyber operations 
do not come under the definition of attacks? The Tallinn Manual, for exam-
ple, unequivocally states that the prohibition on attacking civilian objects 
only applies to cyber operations that qualify as “attacks.”32 These questions 
are therefore of crucial significance. 
The first matter that must be examined in order to answer these ques-
tions is whether the principle of distinction is limited only to attacks or 
whether it covers a wider range of operations. If it is primarily attacks that 
are covered, then it will be necessary to examine whether cyber operations 
might constitute attacks as understood in LOAC. Article 48 of Additional 
Protocol I sets out the following underlying “basic rule”: In order to ensure 
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, 
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military ob-
jectives.”33 
This appears to cast a wide net that could include most cyber opera-
tions. However, it has been noted by Schmitt that most of the specific rules 
                                                                                                                      
might have the potential to cross the threshold of international armed conflict.” TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 22, ¶ 15. 
31. DÖRMANN, supra note 18, at 2; Schmitt, supra note 30, at 102.  
32. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, rule 37, cmt. to rule 37, ¶ 2. 













within the relevant section of the Protocol speak not of any operations, but 
of attacks.34 There is a debate as to the ways in which the reference to mili-
tary “operations”—as opposed to a potentially narrower concept of “at-
tack”—provides protection to the civilian population in the cyber con-
text.35 Notwithstanding that debate, the current analysis focuses on the ap-
plicability of the concept of attack to cyber operations because of its para-
mount importance in the specific rules on targeting and military objectives. 
In the context of lawful targets, Article 52 states that “[c]ivilian objects 
shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals” and that “[a]ttacks shall be 
limited strictly to military objectives.”36 This too appears to confine the rule 
to attacks, rather than any operations. This line of reasoning by Schmitt 
also notes that there are forms of operations, such as psychological opera-
tions conducted by militaries, which do not amount to attacks and which 
may proceed even if targeted at the civilian population.37  
Article 49 of the Protocol defines "Attacks" as “acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”38 The reference to vio-
lence is also included in the Commentary to the Protocol, in relation to the 
concept of military operations.39 This leads Schmitt to note the following: 
 
That Additional Protocol I and its official commentary define both op-
erations and attacks by reference to the notion of violence further 
strengthens the conclusion that application of the principle of distinction 
generally depends on an attack having occurred and that an attack is an 
action during armed conflict that is violent in nature.40 
 
Where does this leave cyber operations—might they be considered at-
tacks, and, if not, are they exempt from the principle of distinction, leaving 
a free choice of targets? One argument, proposed by Dörmann, is that 
 
                                                                                                                      
34. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 91–93. 
35. See the examination of this issue in DINNISS, supra note 6, at 196–202. 
36. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 52 (emphases added). 
37. “[U]nless they cause physical harm or human suffering.” Schmitt, supra note 30, at 
91. 
38. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 49(1). 
39. “Finally, the word ‘operations’ should be understood in the context of the whole 
of the Section; it refers to military operations during which violence is used, and not to 
ideological, political or religious campaigns.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS, supra note 4, ¶ 1875. 












[t]he fact that CNA [computer network attack] does not lead to the de-
struction of the object attacked is irrelevant. In accordance with Art. 
52(2) of AP I only those objects, which make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutrali-
zation offers a definite military advantage, may be attacked. By referring 
not only to destruction or capture of the object but also to its neutraliza-
tion the definition implies that it is irrelevant whether an object is disa-
bled through destruction or in any other way.41 
 
But this approach has been countered by Schmitt, noting that the defini-
tion of military objectives, from which the neutralization possibility is tak-
en, applies in the context of an attack, and if the cyber operation is not an 
“attack” as understood in the ius in bello then there is actually no need to 
reach for the military objective definition at all.42 Although according to 
this view the requirement for a violent component would rule out certain 
cyber operations, it would not exclude them all. For an act to be violent in 
this context, it does not necessarily require a physically violent means of 
delivery: “‘Violence’ merely constituted useful prescriptive shorthand for 
use in rules designed to shield the population from harmful effects. Despite 
being styled as act-based norms (violence), they are in fact consequence-
based.”43 Indeed certain cyber operations—such as in the earlier mentioned 
examples of taking over missile control systems or dams—can lead to vio-
lent effects, and there should be no doubt as to the inclusion of such oper-
ations in the rules on attacks. However, this position would exclude many 
other types of cyber operations from the rules on attacks if their effects do 
not include casualties or physical damage to objects. Otherwise, it is ar-
gued, we could end up ruling that any inconvenience to civilians is prohib-
ited.44 Cyber operations are thereby presented as often more akin to psy-
                                                                                                                      
41. DÖRMANN, supra note 18, at 6.  
42. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 95–96. 
43. Id. at 93. The Tallinn Manual addresses this point as follows: 
 
“Acts of violence” should not be understood as limited to activities that release kinetic 
force. This is well settled in the law of armed conflict. In this regard, note that chemical, 
biological, or radiological attacks do not usually have a kinetic effect on their designated 
target, but it is universally agreed that they constitute attacks as a matter of law.  
 
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 30, ¶ 3 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case 
No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 120, 124 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)). See also Nuclear 
Weapons, supra note 4. 
44. State practice provides no support for the notion that causation of inconven-













chological operations that do not have violent effects, and which would 
then be permissible even when directed at the civilian networks.45 
In principle, this analysis is sound and on solid ground. Clearly there 
are some cyber operations with effects that are equal to any other attack 
and must therefore be conducted within the LOAC rules on lawful targets. 
It is equally evident that there may be cyber operations that have no real 
harmful effect even if directed at civilian networks. There is however, room 
for significant debate as to where the dividing line lies between these two 
descriptions and what is the threshold of harm that leads us into the for-
mer, requiring adherence to the principle of distinction in choosing targets. 
In particular, there is a question over the use of physical harm as the 
threshold. 
First, however, a note of caution is perhaps warranted with regard to 
the analogy between cyber operations and psychological operations, such 
as disseminating propaganda. The latter operations might be directed at the 
civilian population by, for example, issuing calls attempting to convince 
them to abandon support for their leadership: 
 
The mission of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of foreign target au-
diences (TAs) to support U.S. national objectives. PSYOP accomplish 
this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions that 
influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behavior of foreign audiences.46 
 
Such operations are not considered to be ones that cause direct harm to the 
civilian population and, as such, can be excluded from certain restrictions 
placed on attacks.47 They are therefore a very useful demonstration of how 
certain types of operations might target the civilian population and remain 
lawful. But it is less clear that they are the most adequate analogy for cyber 
operations. The nature of such psychological operations is to convince ra-
ther than to create pressure through harm, other than perhaps lowering 
morale. Cyber operations are, in contradistinction, more often designed 
                                                                                                                      
ry, inconvenience and interference with the daily lives of civilians are a frequent re-
sult of armed conflict and psychological operations directed against the civilian pop-
ulation are common.  
 
Schmitt, supra note 30, at 95. 
45. Id. at 92. 
46. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, MCRP 3-40.6, Psychological 
Operations (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf.  












with some form of harmful effect in mind (including relatively low levels of 
harm, such as denial of service operations to disable a website), even if not 
always measurable in casualties. There is a difference between morale and 
harm. Outside of propaganda, what type of analogy might we make with 
cyber operations directed at civilian networks? If they are designed to 
change the behavior of the civilian population through adverse pressure, 
then anything that actively targets civilian networks will likely be causing 
some type of harm, which may cause it to cross the threshold into what we 
consider attacks. Other types of operations directed at civilian networks 
will need to be examined individually and their expected effects must be 
assessed before making any determination. In other words, it is not that 
cyber operations are akin to psychological operations because of the cyber 
format; rather, it is that some specific cyber operations are analogous be-
cause their method and produced effect are no more harmful than psycho-
logical propaganda operations (for example, during the Russia-Georgia 
conflict Georgian websites were defaced and made to portray images of 
President Saakashvili together with a range of dictators).48 This type of 
cyber operation has been described as follows: “Another use of cyber war 
is to send propaganda out to demoralize the enemy, distributing emails and 
other Internet media in place of the former practice of dropping pam-
phlets.”49 But this is not true of all cyber operations; therefore a general 
analogy between cyber operations and psychological ones is too sweeping a 
generalization that risks minimizing the need to examine the effects of the 
cyber operations. 
  
III. THE THRESHOLD OF HARM 
 
What then is the threshold of harm that would lead cyber operations to be 
categorized as attacks subject to the LOAC principle of distinction? There 
appears to be wide agreement that cyber operations that result in casualties 
or physical property damage may be categorized as attacks.50 There is, 
however, strong reason to question whether physical damage is the most 
appropriate threshold. Even if such an approach adheres to a stricter read-
ing of the violence requirement, it should be noted that the concept of vio-
                                                                                                                      
48. See TIKK, KASKA & VIHUL, supra note 7, at 71. 
49. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6, at 11. The authors also describe the case of the 
U.S. military sending e-mails to Iraqi officers prior to the U.S. invasion, urging them to 
abandon their posts and equipment, which many then duly did. Id. at 9–10. 













lence is not only physical, but can, for example, include mental suffering.51 
This is well documented in other areas, such as the prohibition of torture, 
where a wide range of non-physical actions are said to cross the boundary 
into prohibited torture and ill-treatment due to their severe adverse mental 
effects.52 Of course, this is not presented here in order to argue that all 
cyber operations would fall within this area; it is hardly the case that cutting 
off the civilian population from their e-mail access would cause mental dis-
tress at the level of ill-treatment (although that might be true for some of 
us). Nevertheless, it serves to demonstrate that when looking at the possi-
ble violent effects of a cyber operation in order to ascertain whether it 
should be considered an attack, we do need to look wider than physical 
casualties and destruction. In other words, the dividing line is neither the 
format of the attack nor the physical violence involved, but rather the level 
of harm caused. It must be stressed at this point that the argument here is 
not that absolutely any harm would render an operation as being within the 
definition of attacks. It is clear that there is a threshold that must be 
crossed, but there is good reason to question whether physical damage is 
the only possible test for crossing the threshold.  
We return, therefore, to the questions surrounding the qualification of 
cyber operations as attacks—or not—on the basis of their effects. An in-
teresting debate in this regard has emerged through the process surround-
ing the drafting of the Tallinn Manual. There appears to be an emerging 
view among experts that one of the defining criteria could be the level of 
effect on the functionality of the targeted object. According to this ap-
proach, if the functionality is impaired to the point that it requires replace-
ment of physical components, then this would constitute damage as envis-
                                                                                                                      
51. “While the notion of attack extends to injuries and death caused to individuals, it 
is, in light of the law of armed conflict’s underlying humanitarian purposes, reasonable to 
extend the definition to serious illness and severe mental suffering that are tantamount to 
injury.” Id., cmt. to rule 30, ¶ 8. 
52. This can include mock executions, threats of physical violence, exploitation of the 
phobias of detainees, and more. The prohibition on causing serious mental suffering or 
psychological violence has been affirmed in a number of cases at the European, Inter-
American and UN human rights bodies, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia. See analysis and cases cited in NIGEL S. RODLEY & MATT POL-













aged in the concept of attack.53 This approach is not so much a compro-
mise between the earlier mentioned views, but more of a fine-tuning of the 
idea that for an operation to be an attack, it must cause casualties or dam-
age—and in this case allowing for functionality to be a test for damage or 
property destruction. If the test still requires there to be physical compo-
nents that must be replaced, then it ultimately remains very much tied in to 
the notion of physical property damage.  
This insistence on remaining focused on physical property is, however, 
a position that may require rethinking. A functionality test that requires 
physical effects would include as an attack a cyber operation that damages a 
computer system that can be repaired in under an hour by replacing one 
part, but it would exclude a cyber operation that incapacitates a whole sys-
tem for two days if there is no physical damage or repair other than waiting 
for the operation to be over. Moreover, consider this: insisting on physical 
damage means that blocking enemy communications by physically sabotag-
ing the lines or bombing the telephone or fiber-optic cables would be an 
attack, but blocking the same communications through cyber operations 
causing data corruption that does not physically damage property or re-
quire replacement of parts is not an attack. What is the basis for this differ-
entiation? The objective sought, the military advantage gained and the ef-
fects of the operations will be almost identical. Surely it is not because one 
requires physically repositioning a telephone pole and the other does not? 
This seems like an arbitrary distinction that does not take account of mod-
ern reality.  
This issue is also linked to another question which we face when look-
ing at the definition of military objectives, as it appears in the first Addi-
tional Protocol: 
 
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects 
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutrali-
zation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.54 
 
                                                                                                                      
53. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, rule 30, cmt. to rule 30, ¶ 10. There was also a 
subgroup of experts who held the view that this should include loss of functionality that 
can be restored through reinstalling an operating system. 













The problem that arises, which is relatively unique to cyber operations, is 
whether data can be considered an object. While there is no definitive an-
swer to this question, the currently prevailing view among LOAC experts 
appears to hold that in most cases data, for the purposes of LOAC target-
ing, should not be considered an object.55 This reasoning is said to be sup-
ported by well-established interpretations of LOAC, as found in the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’s Commentary to the Protocol.56 Ac-
cording to this Commentary, the term “object” refers to something which is 
“visible and tangible.”57 This, prima facie, certainly does not seem to include 
data. But there is good reason to consider this issue further, and raise the 
possibility that data may nevertheless be akin to an object in this context. 
The reference to “visible and tangible” is not part of the Protocol defini-
tion, but rather the understanding given to it at a particular point in time 
and in a specific context. These must be examined more closely to see 
whether the same reasoning applies to our current situation. At the time of 
drafting it is unlikely that the drafters would have considered the possibility 
of data destruction separate from physical damage. Destroying data at the 
time would have meant physically damaging the storage method, such as 
the paper files. Today, however, it is perfectly possible to destroy vast 
quantities of vital data without physically destroying the computers on 
which they are stored. To place this in context, it raises the question 
whether a kinetic attack that results in the setting on fire of five hundred 
mailbags is any more harmful than a cyber operation that permanently de-
letes five million e-mails. This is a scenario that could hardly have been 
contemplated when the Commentary made the reference to objects being 
“visible and tangible.” Looking beyond this specific phrase into the expla-
nation surrounding its use further reveals why it might not exclude data. 
While the phrase “visible and tangible” is used to discuss what was being 
included, it is equally important to see what it was that was being excluded. 
In fact, the reference to tangible objects is made in order to distinguish ob-
                                                                                                                      
55. “The majority of the International Group of Experts agreed that the law of armed 
conflict notion of object should not be interpreted as including data.” TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 21, cmt. to rule 38, ¶ 5. Relatively uncontroversial exceptions include cases 
where the attack on data leads to casualties or physical damage—in which case it can be 
said that the object of attack was that which was ultimately harmed. See id., cmt. to rule 30, 
¶ 6. Schmitt recognizes certain exceptions, but argues that “[g]enerally, data should not be 
characterized as an object in itself.” Schmitt, supra note 30, at 96. 
56. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 38, ¶ 5. 
57. “It is clear that in both English and French the word means something that is vis-












jects from the very different concept of “general objective (in the sense of 
aim or purpose) of a military operation.”58 Consequently, it is, therefore, at 
least arguable that computer data is closer to what the drafters wanted to 
include as objects than to the notion of what they wanted to exclude as aim 
or purpose. Indeed, domestic legal systems have demonstrated the ability 
to evolve beyond physical conceptions of damage to recognize that, rather 
than physical damage to a computer system, the focus should be on the 
harm to the contents of the system—data included.59  
The question of destroying data raises a further matter, the relevance of 
existing backup data. It might be argued that one of the reasons to exclude 
data from the rules on attacks is that damage has not occurred if the data 
can be retrieved. First, however, it should be noted that if this is the argu-
ment against viewing data as an object, it does, in fact, allow for irretrievable 
data to be classified as within the rules on attacks. Second, one may ques-
tion whether potential restoration capability is the correct test for deter-
mining the nature of the object and the lawfulness of targeting it. This is 
not the test we use for physical property. In fact, most physical property is 
not irretrievable—buildings can be rebuilt, cars can be remanufactured; it is 
often just a question of cost. Restoration of complex digital data might be 
restorable from a backup, but this too has a cost. Why is causing one costly 
act more lawful than the other, and is it just a question of the degree of 
time and money involved? Perhaps the key here is that data can be backed 
up so that there are multiple copies, in which case it might be claimed that 
destroying one copy is not really harmful or damaging since copies exist 
elsewhere. But how is the attacker to know this? If this is the argument, 
would the rules on taking precautions require verification of the existence 
of backup copies?60 Moreover, once again it is useful to compare this sce-
                                                                                                                      
58. Id., ¶ 2010. See a similar analysis by Dinniss of what the commentators meant to 
exclude, leading her to note that “any computer program, database, system or virtual net-
work would still be a legitimate target if it meets the above definition, regardless of wheth-
er it has a tangible component or exists purely as lines of code.” DINNISS, supra note 6, at 
185. 
59. This is evident from the wording of the Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18 (Eng.) 
and the Police and Justice Act, 2006, c. 48 (Eng.). See also R. v. Victor Lindesay, [2001] 
EWCA (Crim) 1720; R. v. Simon Lee Vallor, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 2288; Regina v. Steven 
Parr-Moore, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 1907. 
60. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 57. Note that this creates an additional 
problem, since if this argument claims that data destruction is not an attack, one might 
then say that the rules on precautions in attack do not apply, which would in turn leave us 













nario to a non-data situation: if a paper document facility or a library is de-
stroyed, do we say it was not an attack because there are copies of the same 
books in another facility or library? Why treat computer data differently? 
Notwithstanding the above, this argument will take on a different 
shape in the context of cultural objects. It is possible that digital archives 
might be considered cultural property,61 and as such benefit from added 
protections to objects of this type.62 In this context, backup copies may 
well play a role, since the uniqueness of an object will often be one of the 
reasons behind its cultural property protection. If, therefore, it is verifiable 
and known that additional and equal copies exist and that they will remain 
unharmed, it may be that a digital item might not benefit from the special 
protection.63 But the relevance of backup copies is considered here only in 
the context of the applicability of extra protections for unique items of cul-
tural value; the general rules on attacking objects should not—as demon-
strated above—be affected by this.  
There are, of course, limits to the analogies that can be made between 
the cyber sphere and the physical world. For example, just as we hold dis-
cussions of data as objects, some might also question whether computer 
network systems are considered to be part of the infrastructure of a State; 
this in turn may lead to a claim that taking over the network infrastructure 
of a State is akin to taking over its territory.64 Considering that we have al-
ready seen arguments being made in the context of Gaza that a State 
should be considered an occupying power due to control exerted from the 
outside and without boots on the ground,65 might we one day see argu-
ments calling for the obligations stemming from the laws of occupation to 
be applied to occupation through control of network infrastructure? This 
                                                                                                                      
61. See examples in the TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 82, ¶ 5. 
62. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 22, Mar. 26, 
1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212. 
63. See discussion in TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 82, ¶ 6. 
64. But see id., ch. VI, ¶ 3 (“[C]yber operations cannot alone suffice to establish or 
maintain the degree of authority over territory necessary to constitute an occupation.”). 
65. The debate over the status of Gaza contains some genuinely complex questions as 
to the definition, nature and purpose of the laws of occupation. For an examination of 
some of these issues, see, e.g., Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza after 
Israel’s Disengagement, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2005, at 
369–83 (2005). See also the opinions expressed in SARI BASHI & KENNETH MANN, DIS-













sounds extremely far-fetched, and probably rightly so. As the Tallinn Manu-
al correctly points out, “[t]here is no legal notion of occupation in cyber-
space.”66 The creation of such a notion is not an argument being proposed 
or supported here; its possibility is simply being raised as a warning sign of 
things to come.  
However, just as the attempts to apply the law to cyber realities might 
be stretched beyond credibility, equally, attempts to resist updated interpre-
tations will result in stagnant and even obsolete rules. To avoid both mis-
application and obsolescence, we must accept that the law cannot forever 
be interpreted and applied in exactly the same manner, lock, stock and bar-
rel. If we wish to ensure the relevance of the rules to the twenty-first centu-
ry, it is vital that they are interpreted in light of modern reality. Proposing 
new interpretations is not the same as saying the law itself is inadequate to 
deal with new challenges. While there are times that new laws are deemed 
necessary to confront contemporary battlefield realities,67 at other times we 
may be able to rely on the existing body of international law for many of 
the current and future challenges, just as its general principles have been 
deemed applicable to numerous technological advances during the past 
century: 
 
Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented after most of the principles and 
rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict had already come 
into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 1974–1977 left these weap-
ons aside, and there is a qualitative as well as quantitative difference be-
tween nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be 
concluded from this that the established principles and rules of humani-
tarian law applicable in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. 
Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humani-
tarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates the 
entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all 
                                                                                                                      
66. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, ch. VI, ¶ 3. 
67. A clear example of these is the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, which contained rules designed to cover developments on the 
battlefield in relation to means, methods and participants in combat. See also Nuclear Weap-
ons, supra note 4, ¶ 76 (“Since the turn of the century, the appearance of new means of 
combat has—without calling into question the longstanding principles and rules of inter-
national law—rendered necessary some specific prohibitions of the use of certain weap-
ons, such as explosive projectiles under 400 grammes, dum-dum bullets and asphyxiating 














kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the 
future.68 
 
There should be no doubt that existing law can apply to the cyber 
sphere, but there must be room for new approaches and interpretations 
that might differ from the manner in which the same law was read in the 
past.69 The earlier discussion of considering data as an object for the pur-
pose of targeting rules is a case in point. The law itself does not exclude the 
possibility; rather, those who exclude data do so by relying on past inter-
pretations of the law that were necessarily wedded to the time.70 Instead, it 
is perfectly possible to remain true to the object and purpose of the law—
and indeed to the letter of the law itself—by interpreting it in light of the 
modern-day context in which it is being implemented.71 This is therefore a 
call for new interpretations in light of reality, and not a call to overhaul the 
law itself.72 In the context of cyber operations, this requires rethinking the 
nature of harm required for crossing the threshold into actions that are 
regulated by the rules on attacks. Rather than focus on the type of harm, the 
focus should be on the level of harm, regardless of whether or not the ef-
fects are caused through physical destruction. Massive deletion of data 
from institutional archives (e.g., educational institutions, local councils, 
government offices) is an example of an act which can cause a significant 
                                                                                                                      
68. Id., ¶ 86. 
69. See, for example, the White House International Strategy for Cyberspace: 
 
The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention 
of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. 
Long-standing international norms guiding state behavior—in times of peace and con-
flict—also apply in cyberspace. Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked technology 
require additional work to clarify how these norms apply and what additional understand-
ings might be necessary to supplement them. 
 
THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECU-
RITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 9 (2011), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf. 
70. See, e.g., referring to objects as “visible and tangible.” See supra text accompanying 
note 57. 
71. The first rule on the interpretation of treaties states that “[a] treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added).  
72. There are, however, also arguments being made for creating new laws to regulate 
cyber operations. See, e.g., the call for a new framework of “international law for infor-
mation operations” in Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information 












level of harm without leading to physical destruction or casualties. These 
should at the least be considered as having crossed the threshold so as to 
be regulated by the rules on attacks, and subject to the principle of distinc-
tion with regard to choice of targets. 
The above questions on the categorization of operations as attacks 
must also be viewed in light of the underlying concerns behind some of the 
positions. Much of this debate is occurring in the context of excluding cer-
tain operations from the definition of attacks so that they will not be ham-
pered by the restrictions placed in LOAC, and so that we do not end up 
describing any disruption to civilian networks as unlawful.73 But this con-
cern is, to a certain extent, misplaced. Note that we are seeking to examine 
the categorization of operations directed against civilian networks, and not 
about operations against so-called dual-use networks.74 Directing operations 
against civilian networks intending to cause negative effects for the civilian 
population should not be an encouraged military activity, and by ensuring 
that these operations are considered attacks, we can afford better protec-
tion to civilians. At the same time, having a lower threshold of toleration 
for operations against pure civilian networks should not have a detrimental 
effect on military needs—it does not prevent attacks on dual-use networks, 
which could be legitimate military objectives.75 If the primary concern is the 
latter, then this debate is misplaced since defining the operation as an at-
tack would still allow for the target to be a legitimate military objective. The 
primary concern would then be the separate matter of indiscriminate at-
tacks or collateral damage, and whether the harm caused to the civilians is 
acceptable disruption or rises to the level of damage that tips the balance in 
the proportionality formula—but these are separate questions from our 
current focus on the lawfulness of choosing a particular target.76  
A final point on whether cyber operations are “attacks” is a reminder 
that in other contexts States have rightly clarified that when analyzing the 
legality of an attack, one must look at the attack as a whole,77 recognizing 
                                                                                                                      
73. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 95.  
74. Note that under LOAC there is no specific rule for categorizing objects as dual-
use. They are either a military objective or not. The fact that a military objective may be 
used for civilian purposes does not remove its status as a military objective, but will have 
consequences with regard to the precautions, and means and methods employed, which 
can then in turn determine the lawfulness of the attack. 
75. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 96. 
76. For issues relating to how an attack may be carried out, see supra note 18. 
77. For example, see the statement of the United Kingdom on Articles 51 and 57 up-













that a specific operation might be “part of the complex mosaic of a bigger 
integrated operation.”78 To apply this to the question at hand, if a cyber 
operation that alone might not have been described as an attack is, in fact, 
an inherent component in a collection of operations that form a single at-
tack, then this cyber operation must be assessed within the laws applicable 
to attacks,79 including the question of its target. For example, disabling a 
communications network for a few hours might not seem to cause serious 
harm, but if this is carried out in order to mask other activity that enables a 
devastating attack to occur while the enemy cannot communicate then 
clearly the cyber operation was part of the attack.80 Again, as noted in the 
previous point, this does not place undue restrictions on the cyber opera-
tion if its target is indeed a military communications system.  
Notwithstanding all the above, and while it has been argued above that 
there is a need to reconsider the threshold of harm in light of the potential 
for serious non-physical harm, by definition having a threshold means that 
there will be a possibility for certain circumstances to remain below it. Ac-
cordingly, there will be certain cyber operations that do not reach the re-
quired threshold (e.g., cyber operations that are propaganda/psychological 
operations) and which would not constitute an “attack” as defined in the 
law. If so, then the law of armed conflict might not prohibit such an opera-
tion even if directed at a civilian network. We should, however, remember 
that the law of armed conflict is far from being the only legal framework in 
existence. Such operations would not take place in a legal black hole; in-
deed, much attention has been given in recent years to the risks created by 
claiming legal vacuums.81 Depending on the precise circumstances, a host 
of other laws might apply, ranging from telecommunication laws,82 princi-
                                                                                                                      
attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a 
whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.” International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, Reservation/Declaration Text, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument%20 (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). 
78. Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARI-
AN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 162 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).  
79. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 21, cmt. to rule 30, ¶ 16. 
80. For an example of combining cyber operations as an element leading to physical 
attack, see the description of the Israeli attack on the Syrian alleged nuclear facility in 
CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6, at 1–8. 
81. Most notably in the debates surrounding the applicability of international humani-
tarian law and human rights law to actions taken in the “war on terror.” 
82. International Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. 












ples of non-intervention,83 outer space treaties84 and human rights law85 to 
domestic criminal law or international agreements on cyber crime.86 The 
applicability of these branches of law will vary from case to case based on 
the precise circumstances, and they may themselves be subject to debate 
(an obvious example of debate is the disagreement over extraterritorial ap-
plicability of international human rights law).87 However, they cannot be 
ignored and their applicability must at least be considered. This is, in fact, 
not only the case when LOAC does not apply to the operations; indeed, 
some of these branches of law may well apply also during armed conflict, 
though once again this will depend on the specific branch of law under dis-
cussion, and the interplay between it and LOAC will need to be taken into 
account.88 
                                                                                                                      
Disputes Relating to the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, to 
the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union and to the Administrative 
Regulations, Dec. 22, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-34, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996). 
83. For example, under the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
84. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. See discussion of applicability of outer space treaties in James P. Terry, The 
Lawfulness of Attacking Computer Networks in Armed Conflict and in Self-Defense in Periods Short of 
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85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
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1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
86. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Europ. T.S. No. 185. 
87. LUBELL, supra note 22, ch. 8. 
88. The interplay between the law of armed conflict and international human rights 
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Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310 (2007); Nancie 
Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 356 (2007); Françoise J. Hampson, Is Human Rights Law of Any Rele-
vance to Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 485 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies); Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 737 (2005); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights, 















Cyber operations taking place during armed conflict can present a number 
of challenges in discerning the correct legal framework for their regulation. 
Notably, they are an awkward fit for the rubric of laws relating to attacks, 
as these were clearly designed with the primary focus on kinetic attacks. In 
particular, there is the possibility that excluding cyber operations from the 
notion of attack would thereby release these operations from the require-
ment to adhere to the principle of distinction in the choice of targets—one 
of the fundamental principles at the heart of the law of armed conflict. 
Clearly, cyber operations that lead to direct physical damage or casualties 
must be considered attacks. Likewise, those cyber operations that amount 
to no more than propaganda and cause no actual harm might lie outside 
the notion of attacks. This article has argued, however, that the dividing 
line between these two poles cannot rely on the physical nature of the harm 
caused. Rather, the key criteria for the threshold at which an operation 
must be regarded as an attack under the law of armed conflict must rest on 
the level of harm caused, and this can include non-physical damage. Such 
an understanding does not require new laws, but can be a legitimate inter-
pretation of the current law, in line with both its object and purpose, and a 
better reflection of modern reality. 
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